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Abstract
We show that adversarial reinforcement learning
(ARL) can be used to produce market mark-
ing agents that are robust to adversarial and
adaptively-chosen market conditions. To apply
ARL, we turn the well-studied single-agent model
of Avellaneda and Stoikov [2008] into a discrete-
time zero-sum game between a market maker and
adversary. The adversary acts as a proxy for other
market participants that would like to profit at the
market maker’s expense. We empirically com-
pare two conventional single-agent RL agents with
ARL, and show that our ARL approach leads to:
1) the emergence of risk-averse behaviour with-
out constraints or domain-specific penalties; 2) sig-
nificant improvements in performance across a set
of standard metrics, evaluated with or without an
adversary in the test environment, and; 3) im-
proved robustness to model uncertainty. We em-
pirically demonstrate that our ARL method consis-
tently converges, and we prove for several special
cases that the profiles that we converge to corre-
spond to Nash equilibria in a simplified single-stage
game.
1 Introduction
Market making refers to the act of providing liquidity to a
market by continuously quoting prices to buy and sell a given
financial instrument. The difference between these prices
is called a spread, and the goal of a market maker (MM)
is to repeatedly earn a spread by transacting in both direc-
tions. However, this is not done without risk. Market makers
expose themselves to adverse selection, where toxic agents
exploit their technological or informational edge, transacting
with and thereby changing the MM’s inventory before an ad-
verse price move causes them a loss. This is known as inven-
tory risk, and has been the subject of a great deal of research
in optimal control, artificial intelligence, and reinforcement
learning (RL) literature.
A standard assumption in existing work has been that the
MM has perfect knowledge of market conditions. Robustness
of market making strategies to model ambiguity has only re-
cently received attention - Cartea et al. [2017] extend optimal
control approaches for the market making problem to address
the risk of model misspecification. In this paper, we deal with
this type of risk by taking an adversarial approach. We design
market making agents that are robust to adversarial and adap-
tively chosen market conditions by applying adversarial RL.
Our starting point is a well-known single-agent mathematical
model of market making of Avellaneda and Stoikov [2008],
which has been used extensively in the quantitative finance
[Cartea et al., 2015; Cartea et al., 2017; Gue´ant et al., 2011;
Gue´ant, 2017]. We convert this into a discrete-time game,
with a new “market player”, the adversary, that can be thought
of as a proxy for other market participants that would like to
profit at the expense of the market maker. The adversary con-
trols dynamics of the market environment in a zero-sum game
against the market maker.
We evaluate the sensitivity of RL-based strategies to three
core parameters of the market model dynamics that affect
prices and execution, where each of these parameters natu-
rally varies over time in real markets. We thus go beyond
the fixed parametrisation of existing models — henceforth
called the FIXED setting — with two extended learning set-
tings. The RANDOM setting initialises each instance of the
model (that is, episode in RL terminology) with values for the
three parameters that are chosen independently and uniformly
at random from three appropriate intervals. The STRATE-
GIC setting features an adversary – an independent “mar-
ket” learner whose objective is to choose the parameters from
these same intervals so as to minimise the cumulative reward
of the market maker in a zero-sum game. The RANDOM and
STRATEGIC settings are, on the one hand, more realistic than
the FIXED setting, but on the other hand, significantly more
complex for the market making agent. We show that mar-
ket making strategies trained in each of these settings yield
significantly different behaviour, and we demonstrate strik-
ing benefits of our STRATEGIC setting.
1.1 Contributions
The key contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We introduce a game-theoretic adaptation of a standard
mathematical model of market making. Our adaption is
useful to train robust MMs, and evaluate their performance
in the presence of epistemic risk (Sections 2 and 3).
• We propose an algorithm for adversarial reinforcement
learning in the spirit of RARL [Pinto et al., 2017], and
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demonstrate its effectiveness in spite of the well known
challenges associated with finding Nash equilibria of
stochastic games [Littman, 1994] (Sections 4 and 5).
• We thoroughly investigate the impact of three environ-
mental settings (one adversarial) on learning market mak-
ing. We show that training against a STRATEGIC adversary
strictly dominates the other two settings (FIXED and RAN-
DOM) in terms of a set of standard desiderata, including the
Sharpe ratio (Section 5).
• We prove that, in several key instances of the STRATE-
GIC setting, the single-stage instantiation of our game has a
Nash equilibrium resembling that found by our ARL algo-
rithm for the multi-stage game. We then confirm broader
existence of (approximate) equilibria in the multi-stage
game by empirical best response computations (Sections 3
and 5).
1.2 Related Work
Optimal control and market making. The theoretical
study of market making originated from the pioneering work
of Ho and Stoll [1981], Glosten and Milgrom [1985] and
Grossman and Miller [1988], among others. Subsequent
work focused on characterising optimal behaviour under dif-
ferent market dynamics and contexts. Most relevant is the
work of Avellaneda and Stoikov [2008], who incorporated
new insights into the dynamics of the limit order book to give
a new market model, which is the one used in this paper. They
derived closed-form expressions for the optimal strategy of
an MM with an exponential utility function when the MM has
perfect knowledge of the model and its parameters. This same
problem was then studied for other utility functions [Fodra
and Labadie, 2012; Gue´ant et al., 2011; Cartea et al., 2015;
Cartea and Jaimungal, 2015; Gue´ant, 2017]. As mentioned
above, Cartea et al. [2017] study the impact of uncertainty in
the model of Avellaneda and Stoikov [2008]: they drop the
assumption of perfect knowledge of market dynamics, and
consider how an MM should optimally trade while being ro-
bust to possible misspecification. This type of epistemic risk
is the primary focus of our paper.
Machine learning and market making. Several papers
have applied AI techniques to design automated market mak-
ers for financial markets.1 Chan and Shelton [2001] focussed
on the impact of noise from uninformed traders on the quot-
ing behaviour of a market maker trained with reinforcement
learning. Abernethy and Kale [2013] used an online learn-
ing approach. Spooner et al. [2018] later explored the use
of reinforcement learning to train inventory-sensitive market
making agents in a fully data-driven limit order book model.
Most recently, Gue´ant and Manziuk [2019] addressed scaling
issues of finite difference approaches for high-dimensional,
multi-asset market making using model-based RL. While the
approach taken in this paper is also based on RL, unlike
1A separate strand of work in AI and Economics and Compu-
tation has studied automated market makers for prediction markets,
see e.g., Othman [2012]. While some similarities to the financial
market making problem pertain, the focus in that strand of work fo-
cusses much more on price discovery and information aggregation.
the majority of these works, our underlying market model is
taken from the mathematical finance literature. There, mod-
els are typically analysed using methods from optimal con-
trol. We justify this choice in Section 2. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to apply ARL to derive trading
strategies that are robust to epistemic risk.
Risk-sensitive reinforcement learning. Risk-sensitivity
and safety in RL has been a highly active topic for some
time. This is especially true in robotics where exploration
is very costly. For example, Tamar et al. [2012] studied pol-
icy search in the presence of variance-based risk criteria, and
Bellemare et al. [2017] presented a technique for learning
the full distribution of (discounted) returns; see also Garcıa
and Ferna´ndez [2015]. These techniques are powerful, but
can be complex to implement and can suffer from numer-
ical instability. This is especially true when using expo-
nential utility functions which, without careful considera-
tion, may diverge early in training due to large negative re-
wards [Maddison et al., 2017]. An alternative approach is
to train agents in an adversarial setting [Pinto et al., 2017;
Pe´rolat et al., 2018] in the form of a zero-sum game. These
methods tackle the problem of epistemic risk2 by explicitly
accounting for the misspecification between train- and test-
time simulations. This robustness to test conditions and ad-
versarial disturbances is especially relevant in financial prob-
lems and motivated the approach taken in this paper.
2 Trading Model
We consider a standard model of market making as intro-
duced by Avellaneda and Stoikov [2008] and studied by many
others including Cartea et al. [2017]. The MM trades a sin-
gle asset for which the price, Zn, evolves stochastically. In
discrete-time,
Zn+1 = Zn + bn∆t+ σnWn, (1)
where bn and σn are the drift and volatility coefficients, re-
spectively. The randomness comes from the sequence of in-
dependent, Normally-distributed random variables, Wn, each
with mean zero and variance ∆t. The process begins with
initial value Z0 = z and continues until step N is reached.
The market maker interacts with the environment at each
step by placing limit orders around Zn to buy or sell a single
unit of the asset. The prices at which the MM is willing to buy
(bid) and sell (ask) are denoted by p+n and p
−
n , respectively,
and may be expressed as offsets from Zn:
δ±n = ±[Zn − p±n ] ≥ 0; (2)
these may be updated at each timestep at no cost to the agent.
Equivalently, we may define:
ψn = δ
+
n + δ
−
n > 0,
pn =
1
2
(p+n + p
−
n ) = Zn +
1
2
(δ−n − δ+n ),
(3)
called the quoted spread and reservation price, respectively.
These relate to the agent’s need for immediacy and bias in
execution, amongst other things.
2The problem of robustness has also been studied outside of the
use of adversarial learning; see, e.g., [Rajeswaran et al., 2017].
In a given time step, the probability that one or both of the
agent’s limit orders are executed depends on the liquidity in
the market and the values δ±n . Transactions occur when mar-
ket orders, which arrive at random times, have sufficient size
to consume one of the agent’s limit orders. These interactions
are modelled by independent Poisson processes, denoted by
N+n and N
−
n for the bid and ask sides, respectively, with in-
tensities λ±n ; not to be confused with the terminal timestep
N . The dynamics of the agent’s inventory process, or hold-
ings, Hn, are then captured by the difference between these
two terms,
Hn = (N
+
n −N−n ) ∈ [H,H], (4)
where H0 is known and the values of Hn are constrained so
that trading stops on the opposing side of the book when ei-
ther limit is reached. The order arrival intensities are given
by:
λ±n = A
±
n e
−k±n δ±n , (5)
where A±n , k
±
n > 0 describe the rate of arrival of market or-
ders and distribution of volume in the book, respectively. This
particular form derives from assumptions and observations on
the structure and behaviour of limit order books which we
omit here for simplicity; see Avellaneda and Stoikov [2008],
Gould et al. [2013], and Abergel et al. [2016] for more de-
tails.
In this framework, the evolution of the market maker’s cash
is given by the difference relation,
Xn+1 = Xn + p
−
n∆N
−
n − p+n∆N+n ,
= Xn + δ
−
n ∆N
−
n + δ
+
n ∆N
+
n − Zn∆Hn,
(6)
where ∆N±n ≡ N±n+1−N±n . The cash flow is a combination
of: the profit due to executing at the premium δ±n , and the
change in value of the agent’s holdings. The total value accu-
mulated by the agent by timestep n may thus be expressed as
the sum of the cash held and value invested: Π(Xn, Hn, Zn),
where
Π(X,H,Z) = X +HZ, (7)
and Πn ≡ Π(Xn, Hn, Zn). This is known as the mark-to-
market (MtM) value of the agent’s portfolio.
Why not use a data driven approach? Previous research
into the use of RL for market making — and trading more
generally — has focussed on data-driven limit order book
models; see Nevmyvaka et al. [2006], Spooner et al. [2018],
and Vyetrenko and Xu [2019]. These methods, however, are
not amenable to the type of analysis presented in Section 3.
Using an analytical model allows us to examine the charac-
teristics of adversarial training in isolation while minimising
systematic error due to bias often present in historical data.
3 Game Formulation and Single-Stage
Analysis
We use the market dynamics above to define a zero-sum
stochastic game between a market maker and an adversary
that acts as a proxy for all other market participants.
Definition 1. [Market Making Game] The game between
MM and an adversary has N stages. At each stage, MM
chooses δ± and the adversary {b, A±, k±}. The resulting
stage payoff is given by expected change in MtM value of the
MM’s portfolio, i.e., E[∆Π], see (7). The total payoff paid by
the adversary to MM is the sum of the stage payoffs.
In the remainder of this section, we study theoretically the
game when N = 1, i.e., when there is a single stage. Later,
in Section 5, we analyse empirically the game for N = 200.
Single-stage analysis. At each stage, the MM’s payoff may
be unrolled to give:
f(δ±; b, A±, k±) = λ+ · (δ+ +b)+λ− · (δ−−b)+bH. (8)
For certain parameter ranges, this equation is concave in δ±.
Lemma 1 (Payoff Concavity in δ±). The payoff (8) is a con-
cave function of δ± on the intervals [0, 2/k−b], and [0, 2/k+b],
respectively.
Proof. The first derivative of the payoff w.r.t. δ± is given by:
∂f
∂δ±
= λ±
[
1− k(δ± ∓ b)] . (9)
The Hessian matrix is thus given by,{
k+λ+ [k+(δ+ + b)− 2] 0
0 k−λ− [k−(δ− − b)− 2]
}
,
which is negative semi-definite iff δ± ≤ 2k± ∓ b.
Note that (8) is linear in both b and A±. From this, we
next show that there exists a Nash equilibrium (NE) when δ±
and b are controlled, and k± and A± are fixed.
Theorem 1 (NE for fixed A±, k±). There is a pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium (δ±? , b?) for (δ
+, δ−) ∈ [0, 2/k − b] ×
[0, 2/k + b] and b ∈ [b, b] (with finite b, b),
δ±? =
1
k
± b?; b? =
{
b H > 0,
b H < 0,
(10)
which is unique for |H| > 0. When H = 0, there is an
equilibrium for every value b? ∈ [b, b].
Proof. Equating (9) to zero and solving gives (10). To prove
that these correspond to a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium of
the game we show that the payoff is quasi-concave (resp.
quasi-convex) in the MM’s (resp. adversary’s) strategy and
then apply Sion’s minimax theorem [Sion, 1958]. This fol-
lows from Lemma 1 for MM, and by the linearity of the ad-
versary’s payoff w.r.t. b. For |H| > 0, there is a unique solu-
tion. When H = 0, there exists a continuum of solutions, all
with equal payoff.
The solution (10) has a similar form to that of the optimal
strategy for linear utility with terminal inventory penalty [Fo-
dra and Labadie, 2012], or equivalently that of a myopic agent
with running penalty [Cartea and Jaimungal, 2015]. Interest-
ingly, the extension of Theorem 1 to an adversary with control
over all three model parameters {b, A±, k±} yields a similar
result. In this case we refer the reader the extended version
of the paper [?] for a proof, and leave uniqueness to future
work.
Theorem 2 (NE for general case). There exists a pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium (δ±? , {b?, A±? , k±? }) of the MM game
for (10), A±? = A and k
±
? = k.
4 Adversarial Training
The single-stage setting is informative but unrealistic. Next
we investigate a range of multi-stage settings with various
different restrictions on the adversary, and explore how adver-
sarial training can improve the robustness of MM strategies.
The following three types of adversary in turn increase the
freedom of the adversary to control the market’s dynamics:
FIXED. The simplest possible adversary always plays the
same fixed strategy, for us: bn = 0,A±n = 140 and k
±
n = 1.5;
these values match those originally used by Avellaneda and
Stoikov [2008]. This amounts to a single-agent learning set-
ting with stationary transition dynamics.
RANDOM. The second type of adversary instantiates each
episode with parameters chosen independently and uniformly
at random from the following ranges: bn = b ∈ [−5, 5],
A±n = A ∈ [105, 175] and k±n = k ∈ [1.125, 1.875]. These
are chosen at the start of each episode and remain fixed until
the terminal timestep N . This is analogous to single-agent
RL with non-stationary transition dynamics.
STRATEGIC. The final type of adversary chooses the model
parameters bn, An, kn (bounded as in the previous setting) at
each step of the game. This represents a fully-adversarial and
adaptive learning environment, and unlike the models pre-
sented in related work [Cartea et al., 2017], the source of risk
here is exogenous and reactive to the quotes of the MM.
The principle of adversarial learning here — as with other
successful applications [Goodfellow et al., 2014] — is that
if the MM plays a strategy that is not robust, then this can
(and ideally will) be exploited by the adversary. If a Nash
equilibrium (NE) strategy is played by MM then their strat-
egy is robust and cannot be exploited. While there are no
guarantees that a NE will be reached in our case, we show
in Section 5 via empirical best response computations that
our ARL method does consistently converge to reasonable
approximate NE. Moreover, we show that we consistently
outperform previous approaches in terms of absolute perfor-
mance and robustness to model ambiguity.
Robustness through ARL was first introduced by Pinto et
al. [2017] who demonstrated its effectiveness across a num-
ber of standard OpenAI gym domains. We adapt their RARL
algorithm to support incremental actor-critic based methods
and facilitate asynchronous training; though many of the fea-
tures remain the same. The adversary is trained in parallel
with the market maker, is afforded the same access to state —
including MM’s inventory Hn — and uses the same method
for learning, which is described below.
4.1 Learning Configuration
Both agents use the NAC-S(λ) algorithm, a natural actor-
critic method [Thomas, 2014] for stochastic policies (i.e.,
mixed strategies) using semi-gradient SARSA(λ) [Rummery
and Niranjan, 1994] for policy evaluation. The value func-
tions are represented by compatible [Peters and Schaal, 2008]
radial basis function networks of 100 Gaussian prototypes
with accumulating eligibility traces [Sutton and Barto, 2018].
States. The state of the environment sn = (tn, Hn) contains
only the current time tn = nTN = n∆t and the agent’s inven-
tory Hn, where the transition dynamics are governed by the
definitions introduced in Section 2.
Policies. The market maker learns a bivariate Normal pol-
icy for p˜n ≡ pn − Sn and ψn with diagonal covariance
matrix. The mean and variance vectors are modelled by
linear function approximators using 3rd-order polynomial
bases [Lagoudakis and Parr, 2003]. Both variances and the
mean of the spread term, ψn, are kept positive via a softplus
transformation. The adversary learns a Beta policy [Chou et
al., 2017], shifted and scaled to cover the market parameter
intervals. The two shape parameters are learnt the same as for
the variance of the Normal distribution above, with a transla-
tion of +1 to ensure unimodality and concavity.
Rewards. The reward function is an adaptation of the opti-
misation objective of Cartea et al. [2017] and others, for the
RL setting of incremental, discrete-time feedback:
Rn = ∆Πn − ζH2n −
{
0 for t < T,
ηH2n otherwise,
(11)
where Πn refers to the MtM value of the agent’s holdings
(Eq. 7). This formulation can be either risk-neutral (RN) or
risk-adverse (RA). For example, if η > 0 and ζ = 0, then the
agent is punished if the terminal inventory HN is non-zero,
and the solution becomes time-dependent. We refer to this
case as RA and the case of η = ζ = 0 as RN.
5 Experiments
In each of the experiments to follow, the value function was
pre-trained for 1000 episodes (with a learning rate of 10−3) to
reduce variance in early policy updates. Both the value func-
tion and policy were then trained for 106 episodes, with pol-
icy updates every 100 time steps, and a learning rate of 10−4
for both the critic and policy. The value function was config-
ured to learn λ = 0.97 returns. The starting time was chosen
uniformly at random from the interval t0 ∈ [0.0, 0.95], with
starting priceZ0 = 100 and inventoryH0 ∈ [H = −50, H =
50]. Innovations in Zn occurred with fixed volatility σ = 2
between [t0, 1] with increment ∆t = 0.005.
5.1 Market Maker Desiderata
Market makers typically aim to maximise profits while con-
trolling inventory and quoted spread. Higher terminal wealth
with lower variance, less exposure to inventory risk and
smaller spreads are all indicators of the risk aversion (or lack
thereof) of a strategy. This is reflected in the majority of ob-
jective functions for market markers studied in the literature.
We consider the following quantitative desiderata:
Profit and loss / Sharpe Ratio. The distribution of a trading
strategy’s profit and loss is the most fundamental object used
to measure its performance. In our setup, we look at an
agent’s distribution of episodic terminal wealth. In particu-
lar, we look at the moments E[ΠN ] and V[ΠN ] of this dis-
tribution, where the agent would like to maximise the former
(a) Reservation price offset, p˜(t,H). (b) Quoted spread, ψ(t,H).
Figure 1: Most probable action for the risk-averse Gaussian policy learnt using NAC-S(λ) with η = 0 and ζ = 0.01.
η ζ Term. wealth Sharpe Term. inventory Avg. spread
0.0 0.0 67.0± 12.0 5.57 0.56± 7.55 1.42± 0.02
1.0 0.0 61.3± 8.5 7.25 −0.04± 1.19 1.76± 0.02
0.5 0.0 63.0± 9.9 6.34 0.03± 1.24 1.67± 0.03
0.1 0.0 66.4± 9.4 7.06 −0.16± 1.86 1.42± 0.02
0.01 0.0 66.8± 11.1 6.00 0.87± 4.38 1.42± 0.02
0.0 0.01 63.4± 6.8 9.36 0.01± 1.45 1.60± 0.02
0.0 0.001 66.1± 7.4 8.94 0.15± 2.97 1.44± 0.02
(a) Market makers trained against the FIXED adversary.
η ζ Term. wealth Sharpe Term. inventory Avg. spread
0.0 0.0 66.7± 11.8 5.65 0.38± 7.14 1.36± 0.05
1.0 0.0 59.4± 7.6 7.79 0.02± 1.09 1.87± 0.02
0.5 0.0 62.9± 8.4 7.51 −0.04± 1.21 1.68± 0.02
0.1 0.0 65.8± 9.3 7.07 −0.18± 1.57 1.46± 0.03
0.01 0.0 66.6± 9.9 6.69 −0.65± 3.92 1.47± 0.02
0.0 0.01 64.0± 6.7 9.54 −0.06± 1.31 1.60± 0.02
0.0 0.001 65.9± 7.2 9.11 −0.07± 2.62 1.44± 0.02
(b) Market makers trained against the RANDOM adversary.
Term. wealth Sharpe Term. inventory Avg. spread
RN
b 65.5± 6.9 9.51 0.04± 2.14 1.43± 0.01
A± 66.9± 13.1 5.11 2.45± 7.76 1.46± 0.02
k± 66.9± 12.7 5.27 0.52± 7.92 1.45± 0.02
b, A±, k± 65.1± 6.7 9.78 −0.05± 1.94 1.44± 0.02
Full
η = 1.0 60.5± 6.8 8.88 −0.02± 0.97 1.75± 0.02
η = 0.5 63.3± 6.8 9.32 −0.07± 1.05 1.60± 0.01
η = 0.1 64.8± 6.7 9.72 −0.06± 1.37 1.49± 0.02
η = 0.01 65.0± 6.7 9.69 −0.08± 1.89 1.49± 0.01
ζ = 0.01 62.9± 6.7 9.43 −0.03± 1.19 1.65± 0.02
ζ = 0.001 64.3± 6.5 9.85 0.0± 1.71 1.44± 0.01
(c) Market makers trained against a STRATEGIC adversary.
Table 1: MM performance in terms of the standard desiderata. Each
value was computed by evaluating the policy over 105 episodes
and computing the mean and sample standard deviation. Each test
episode was generated with a FIXED adversary. Wealth and average
spread are measured in units of “currency”; inventory in terms of
units of the “asset”; and the Sharpe ratio is unitless.
while minimising the latter. To this end, a common metric
used in financial literature and in industry is the Shape ratio:
E[ΠN ]
V[ΠN ] , in essence, the reward per unit of risk.
3 While larger
values are better, it is important to note that the Sharpe ratio
is not a sufficient statistic.
Terminal inventory. The distribution of terminal inventory,
HN , tells us about the robustness of the strategy to adverse
price movements. In practice, it is desirable for a market
maker to finish the trading day with small absolute values for
HN ; though this is not always a strict requirement.
Quoted spread. The “competitiveness” of a market maker
is often discussed in terms of the average quoted spread:
En[ψn]. Tighter spreads imply more efficient markets and ex-
changes often compensate (with rebates) for smaller spreads.
5.2 Results
FIXED setting. We first trained MMs against the FIXED ad-
versary; i.e., a standard single-agent learning environment.
Both RN and RA formulations of Eq. 11 were used with risk
parameters η ∈ {1, 0.5, 0.1, 0.01} and ζ ∈ {0.01, 0.001}.
Table 1a summarises the performance for the resulting agents.
To provide some further intuition, we illustrate one of the
learnt policies in Figure 1. In this case, the agent learnt to
offset its price asymmetrically as a function of inventory, with
increasing intensity as we approach the terminal time.
RANDOM setting. Next MMs were trained in an environ-
ment with a RANDOM adversary; a simple extension to the
training procedure that aims to develop robustness to epis-
temic risk. To compare with earlier results, the strategies
were also tested against the FIXED adversary — a summary
of which, for the same set of risk parameters, is given in Ta-
ble 1b. The impact on test performance in the face of model
ambiguity was then evaluated by comparing market makers
trained on the FIXED adversary with those trained against the
RANDOM adversary. Specifically, out-of-sample tests were
carried out in an environment with a RANDOM adversary.
This means that the model dynamics at test-time were differ-
ent from those at training time. While not explicitly adversar-
ial, this misspecification of the model represents a non-trivial
challenge for robustness. Overall, we found that market mak-
ers trained against the FIXED adversary exhibited no change
3While the Sharpe ratio would normally use returns, for our rel-
ative comparison of agents we use terminal wealth.
Figure 2: Policy learnt by the adversary for manipulating price
against the market maker with η = ζ = 0.
in average wealth creation, but an increase of 98.1% in the
variance across all risk parametrisations. On the other hand,
market makers originally trained against the RANDOM adver-
sary yielded a lower average 86.0% increase in the variance.
The RANDOM adversary helps, but not by much compared
with the STRATEGIC adversary, as we will see next.
STRATEGIC setting. In this setting, we first consider an
adversary that controls the drift b only. With RN rewards,
we found that the adversary learns a (time-independent) bi-
nary policy (Figure 2) that is identical to the strategy in the
corresponding single-stage game; see Section 3. We also
found that the strategy learnt by the MM in this setting gener-
ates profits and associated Sharpe ratios in excess of all other
strategies seen thus far when tested against the FIXED adver-
sary (see Table 1c). This is true also when comparing with
tests run against the RANDOM or STRATEGIC adversaries,
suggesting that the adversarially trained MM is indeed more
robust to test-time model discrepancies.
This, however, does not extend to STRATEGIC adversaries
with control over either only A± or only k±. In these cases,
performance was found to be no better than the corresponding
MMs trained in the FIXED setting with a conventional learn-
ing setup. The intuition for this again derives from the single-
stage analysis. That is, the adversary almost surely chooses a
strategy that minimisesA± (equiv. maximises k±) in order to
decrease the probability of execution, thus decreasing MM’s
profits derived from execution and MM’s ability to manage
inventory effectively. The control afforded to the adversary
must correlate in some way with sources of variance — such
as inventory speculation — in order for robustness to corre-
spond to practicable forms of risk-aversion.
Then the natural question is then whether an adversary with
simultaneous control over b, A±, and k± produces strategies
outperforming those where the adversary controls b alone.
This is plausible since combining the three model parameters
can lead to more interesting strategies, e.g., driving inventory
up/down only to increase drift at the peak (i.e., pump and
dump). We investigated by training an adversary with control
over all three parameters. The resulting performance can be
found in Table 1c, which shows an improvement in the Sharpe
ratio of 0.27 and lower variance on terminal wealth. Interest-
ingly, these MMs also quote tighter spreads on average — the
values even approaching that of the risk-neutral MM trained
against a FIXED adversary. This indicates that the strategies
are able to achieve epistemic risk aversion without charging
more to counterparties.
Exploring the impact of varying risk parameters of the
reward function, η and ζ (see (11)), we found that in all
cases MM strategies trained against a STRATEGIC adversary
with an RA reward outperformed their counterparts in Ta-
bles 1a and 1b. It is unclear, however, if changes to the re-
ward function away from the RN variant actually improved
the strategy in general. Excluding when ζ = 0.001, all val-
ues appear to do worse than for an adversarially trained MM
with RN reward. It may well be that the addition of inventory
penalty terms actually boosts the power of the adversary and
results in strategies that try to avoid trading at all, a frequent
problem in this domain.
Verification of approximate equilibria. Holding the strat-
egy of one player fixed, we empirically computed the best
response against it by training. We found consistently that
neither the trader nor adversary deviated from their policy.
This suggests that our ARL method were finding reasonable
approximate Nash equilibria. While we do not provide a
full theoretical analysis of the stochastic game, these find-
ings are corroborated by those in Section 3, since, as seen
in Figure 2, the learned policy in the multi-stage setting cor-
responds closely to the equilibrium strategy from the single-
stage case that was presented in Section 3.
6 Conclusions
We introduced a new approach for learning trading strate-
gies with ARL. The learned strategies are robust to the dis-
crepancies between the market model in training and testing.
We show that our approach leads to strategies that outper-
form previous methods in terms of PnL and Sharpe ratio, and
have comparable spread efficiency. This is shown to be the
case for out-of-sample tests in all three of the considered set-
tings, FIXED, RANDOM, and STRATEGIC. In other words,
our learned strategies are not only more robust to misspecifi-
cation, but also dominate in overall performance.
In some special cases we show that the learned strategies
correspond to Nash equilibria of the corresponding single-
stage game. More widely, we empirically show that the
learned strategies correspond to approximate equilibria in the
multi-stage stochastic game.
In future we plan to:
1. Extend to oligopolies of market makers.
2. Apply to data-driven and multi-asset models.
3. Further explore existence of equilibria and design
provably-convergent algorithms.
Finally, we remark that, while our paper focuses on market
making, the approach can be applied to other trading scenar-
ios such as optimal execution and statistical arbitrage, where
we believe it is likely to offer similar benefits. Further, it
is important to acknowledge that this methodology has sig-
nificant implications for safety of RL in finance. Training
strategies that are explicitly robust to model misspecification
makes deployment in the real-world considerably more prac-
ticable.
Software. All our code is freely accessible on GitHub:
https://github.com/tspooner/rmm.arl.
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